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Abstract This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establish
positive contributions to public goods in the absence of powerful institutions to
provide the public good and to sanction free-riders. In this mechanism players
commit to the public good by paying a deposit prior to the contribution stage.
If there is universal commitment, deposits are immediately refunded whenever a
player contributes her specified share to the public good. If there is no universal
commitment, all deposits are refunded and the standard game is played. For suit-
able deposits, prior commitment and full ex post contributions are supported as
a strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the resulting game. As the mecha-
nism obviates the need for any ex post prosecution of free-riders, it is particularly
suited for situations where players do not submit to a common authority as in
the case of international agreements.
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1 Introduction
One of the most prominent examples for the failure of markets concerns the
provision of public goods. The conflict of interest between the socially desirable
and individually optimal contribution to the public good commonly prevents
the implementation of Pareto optimal solutions — not only theoretically but also
empirically (e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). Due to the often immense welfare gains
at stake (e.g. clean water/air), the question of how to establish high contribution
rates in public goods games is a key issue in economic policy.
An “easy” way out of such social dilemmas is the introduction of sanctioning
institutions that enforce contributions to public goods (e.g. a reliable jurisdic-
tion). Already casual evidence suggests that, once individual deviations from
previously agreed contribution rates can be appropriately punished, many public
goods can be — and indeed are — established at a level close to the social opti-
mum (e.g. public transport, health care, quiet sleeping hours at night). Evidence
from laboratory experiments further supports this observation (e.g. Falkinger et
al., 2000; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). In fact, more recent studies even show that
individuals, when facing the choice between a social environment with and with-
out sanctioning possibilities, learn to choose the environment with sanctioning
(Gu¨rerk et al., 2006; see also Kosfeld et al., 2006). Moreover, upon being placed
in the desired environment, most players indeed fully contribute to the public
good and punish free-riders (Gu¨rerk et al., 2006).
A sanctioning mechanism, however, requires two things: Firstly, it requires
the presence of an institution with the power to enforce potential sanctions; and
secondly, it requires a social planner who is sufficiently well informed about the
agents’ preferences so that she can impose effective sanctions. Under certain con-
ditions the informational requirement can be relaxed and the planner can design
a game form which, if played by the agents, yields in equilibrium the outcome
prescribed by a social choice function for any profile of preferences. There is a
large literature on how to implement a social choice function in this way and we
do not even attempt to provide a complete survey here. The well-known Clarke-
Groves mechanisms (Clarke, 1971, and Groves, 1973) implement an efficient level
of a public good in a dominant strategy equilibrium but the mechanisms are
not budget-balanced and do not yield a Pareto efficient allocation in general.
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Indeed Green and Laffont (1979) show that there is a fundamental conflict be-
tween efficiency and incentive compatibility whenever implementation has to be
in dominant strategies. If instead one considers implementation in subgame per-
fect equilibrium, though, more positive results can be obtained. In fact, almost
any social choice rule can be implemented by subgame perfect equilibrium (Moore
and Repullo, 1988; Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson, 1992). However, the
required mechanisms often are very complex and, hence, of little use for practical
purposes. Several authors have therefore explored simple mechanisms (see, e.g.,
Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Jackson and Moulin, 1992; Varian, 1994).
What is common to all these mechanisms is that they still require the existence
of a strong institution to implement transfers between the agents. Moreover, it is
the institution or the social planner himself who finally provides the public good.
Clearly, these conditions are likely to be satisfied in case of local public goods,
where governmental institutions exist to back up the enforcement and where
the public good is directly provided by the government (education, streetlight,
national security etc.). Yet, in a more and more globalised world, an increasing
number of public goods does not belong to this category. Most prominent among
them are public goods related to environmental issues like global warming, which
have received a lot of attention in the recent economic literature (cf. Carraro,
1999; Bosello, Buchner, and Carraro, 2003; Dutta and Radner, 2004). Here,
the public good “clean air” has to be provided in a decentralized way as each
country has to take measures in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. At the
same time effective sanctioning of free-riders is difficult to establish since there
is no institution like a world government which can punish sovereign countries.
Hence, it is not surprising that we observe a major compliance problem with
climate-change treaties like the Kyoto Protocol.
In the present paper, we take up this issue and propose a simple mechanism
aimed to establish the provision of a public good in cases where effective ex post
sanctioning is difficult, if not impossible to enforce, and where the public good has
to be provided in a decentralized way by the agents themselves. For our analysis,
we take as given some agreement on individual contributions to the public good;
i.e. we are not concerned with the agents’ incentives to actually reach such an
agreement but only with its eventual implementation. The considered agreement
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can, for example, be thought of as the result of some unspecified cooperative
bargaining process among the agents. It may be characterized by a number of
desirable properties like efficiency, individual rationality, equity etc. Like the
Kyoto protocol, however, the agreement is not enforceable due to the absence of
sufficiently strong institutions. Hence, it will be implemented only if all agents
find it in their self-interest to do so.
The idea of our mechanism is to allow players to take an action, prior to
the contribution stage, which renders it a dominant strategy to comply with the
agreement. More specifically, we consider a 2-stage modification of a general
public goods game. In stage 1, players can choose to pay a deposit to a neu-
tral institution. If at the end of stage 1 everyone has paid a deposit, then in
stage 2 the public goods game is played and deposits are refunded to those who
contribute to the public good. If some player has not paid the deposit, all de-
posits are refunded (potentially deducting a small fee to sustain the institution
administering deposits) and the standard public goods game is played in stage 2.
Obviously, universal commitment in the form of paying the deposit as well as full
contributions to the public good now can be rationalised as a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the resulting game. Moreover, as players essentially execute
their own punishment (pay the deposit), the neutral institution considered here
only has to resist demands to repay forfeited deposits. This, however, appears
far easier to enforce than collecting fines from free-riders ex post.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and
analyse our mechanism. A discussion of the mechanism is provided in Section 3.
2 The Mechanism
We consider a standard public goods problem with n players referred to as con-
sumers. Each consumer i, i = 1, ..., n, has a preference relation over consumption
of a private and a public good. These preferences are represented by a utility
function Ui : R2+ → R, where Ui(xi, z) is i’s utility from consuming xi units of
the private good and z units of the public good. We assume that Ui is strictly
increasing:
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Assumption A: For all i, it holds that
∂Ui(xi, z)
∂xi
> 0 and
∂Ui(xi, z)
∂z
> 0.
Each consumer i has an initial endowment ei > 0 of the private good while
the initial level of the public good is zero. The public good is produced in a
decentralized way, i.e. for all i there exists a differentiable production function
fi : [0, ei] → R+ with fi(0) = 0, f ′i > 0, and f ′′i < 0. If consumer i contributes
ci ∈ [0, ei], i = 1, . . . , n, the realized amount of the public good is
z = F
(
n∑
i=1
fi(ci)
)
for some differentiable function F : R+ → R+ with F ′ > 0.
In the context of global warming, the fi can, for example, be thought of as the
country’s technology for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, while F (
∑
i ri) can
be interpreted as the “quality” of the atmosphere if each country i has reduced
its greenhouse gas emissions by ri.
1
If consumers contribute c1, . . . , cn, consumer i’s utility is given by:
pii(c1, . . . , cn) := Ui
(
ei − ci, F
( n∑
j=1
fj(cj)
))
Finally, in order to capture the essence of the public goods problem at issue,
we assume that voluntary contributions are always strictly dominated.
Assumption B: For all (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ ×nj=1[0, ej], it holds that
∂Ui(xi, z)
∂xi
>
∂Ui(xi, z)
∂z
f ′i(ci)F
′(∑
j
fj(cj)
)
,
for all xi and for all i = 1, . . . , n, where z = F (
∑
j fj(cj)).
Under Assumption B it follows that ∂pii(c1, . . . , cn)/∂ci < 0 for all i and all
contribution profiles (c1, . . . , cn).
1Observe that the quality of the atmosphere need not be a linear function of the aggregate
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
5
A simple example for the class of problems considered here is the linear public
goods problem, where Ui(xi, z) = xi + biz, fi(ci) = ci/ai for some positive con-
stants ai, bi with ai > bi, and F (r) = r for all r ≥ 0. For this case, it is immediate
to see that Assumptions A and B are satisfied.
The resulting public goods problem is modelled as an n-player game PG,
where each player i has a strategy set Si = [0, ei] and payoff function pii :
×nj=1Sj → R. Under Assumption B the following Proposition is immediate:
Proposition 1 The strategy profile c0 with c0i = 0 for all i is the unique Nash
equilibrium for PG. Moreover, c0i = 0 is a strictly dominant strategy for all i.
As, in general, the no contribution equilibrium in Proposition 1 does not
lead to an efficient outcome, there is a conflict between individual incentives
and aggregate welfare. The mechanism proposed below remedies this deficiency.
More specifically, it is designed to implement an arbitrary contribution profile
c¯ = (c¯1, . . . , c¯n) ∈ ×nj=1(0, ej] that Pareto dominates the no contribution profile,
i.e.
pii(c¯1, . . . c¯n) > pii(0, . . . , 0) for all i = 1, . . . , n. (1)
As mentioned before, the vector of contributions c¯ can, for example, be thought
of as the result of some cooperative bargaining process among the players which
cannot be enforced, e.g. due to a lack of strong institutions.
Beyond (1), no further assumptions on c¯ are necessary. In particular, it is not
required that c¯ yields a Pareto efficient allocation. To implement c¯ consider the
following 2-stage modification of PG.
Stage 1 All players simultaneously choose to pay a deposit di ∈ {0, d¯i}, d¯i > 0,
to a neutral institution, e.g. a trustee. At the end of stage 1, the profile of all
deposits paid, denoted by d, is revealed to the players. Thereafter, the game
enters stage 2.
Stage 2 The interaction in this stage depends on d in the following way. If at
the end of stage 1 we have di = 0 for some i, then all deposits are refunded and
in stage 2 the public goods game PG is played. If, however, at the end of stage
1 we have di = d¯i for all i, then in stage 2 a public goods game PG
∗ is played for
which payoffs are as follows:
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pi∗i (c1, . . . , cn) =

Ui
(
ei − ci − di, F
(∑
j fj(cj)
))
, if ci 6= c¯i
Ui
(
ei − ci, F
(∑
j fj(cj)
))
, if ci = c¯i
Thus, if all players have decided to pay their deposit, these deposits are only
refunded to those players who contribute to the public good in the previously
agreed way, i.e. for whom ci = c¯i.
The 2-stage game defined above is denoted by P̂G. Player i’s payoff in P̂G is
given by:
Πi[(d1, c1), . . . , (dn, cn)] =
 pi
∗
i (c1, . . . , cn) , if dj = d¯j for all j
pii(c1, . . . , cn) , else
A strategy for player i in P̂G is given by a tuple (di, cˆi), where di ∈ {0, d¯i} and
cˆi : {0, d¯1} × . . .× {0, d¯n} → [0, ei].
Let d¯i ≤ ei be such that
Ui
(
ei − c¯i, F
(∑
j 6=i
fj(cj) + fi(c¯i)
))
> Ui
(
ei − d¯i, F
(∑
j 6=i
fj(cj)
))
(2)
for all cj ∈ [0, ej], j 6= i. Since Ui, fi and F are strictly increasing and c¯i > 0,
it follows that (2) is satisfied for any d¯i in a sufficiently small neighbourhood of
c¯i, in particular it is satisfied for d¯i = c¯i. The following result, then, is readily
established:
Proposition 2 Assume that d¯i satisfies (2) for all i. Then, the strategy profile
(d¯, cˆ∗) where d¯ = (d¯1 . . . , d¯n) and
cˆ∗i (d) =

0, if dj = 0 for some j
c¯i, if dj = d¯j for all j
is a strict subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of P̂G. Moreover, for all i, cˆ∗i is
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a strictly dominant strategy at stage 2 and d¯i is a dominant strategy at stage 1,
given that play continues with the strategy profile cˆ∗ at stage 2.
Proof. Consider stage 2 first. If dj = 0 for some j, then PG is played in
stage 2. In this case, cˆ∗i (d) = 0 for all i is the unique Nash equilibrium and it
is in strictly dominant strategies (cf. Proposition 1). If dj = d¯j for all j, then
ci = c¯i is a strictly dominant strategy for player i in PG
∗. To see this, let c−i be
an arbitrary profile of contributions for all players except i. By Assumption B it
follows that
pi∗i (c¯i, c−i) > pi
∗
i (ci, c−i) for all ci 6= c¯i
⇐⇒ pi∗i (c¯i, c−i) > pi∗i (0, c−i)
⇐⇒ Ui
(
ei − c¯i, F
(∑
j 6=i
fj(cj) + fi(c¯i)
))
> Ui
(
ei − d¯i, F
(∑
j 6=i
fj(cj)
))
which is satisfied by definition of d¯i. Hence, cˆ
∗
i (d) as given in the statement of
the proposition is the unique Nash equilibrium in stage 2 and it is in strictly
dominant strategies. What remains to be shown is that d¯i is a dominant strategy
for player i at stage 1 given that play continues with cˆ∗. Consider first the case
where dj = 0 for some j 6= i. Then,
Πi[(d¯i, cˆ
∗
i (d¯i, d−i)), (d−i, cˆ
∗
−i(d¯i, d−i))] = pii(cˆ
∗(d¯i, d−i))
= Ui(ei, 0)
= pii(cˆ
∗(0, d−i))
= Πi[(0, cˆ
∗
i (0, d−i)), (d−i, cˆ
∗
−i(0, d−i))].
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Next, consider the case where dj = d¯j, for all j 6= i. Then, by (1)
Πi[(d¯i, cˆ
∗
i (d¯i, d¯−i)), (d¯−i, cˆ
∗
−i(d¯i, d¯−i))] = pi
∗
i (cˆ
∗(d¯i, d¯−i))
= pi∗i (c¯1, . . . , c¯n)
= pii(c¯1, . . . , c¯n)
> pii(0, . . . , 0)
= pii(cˆ
∗(0, d¯−i))
= Πi[(0, cˆ
∗
i (0, d¯−i)), (d¯−i, cˆ
∗
−i(0, d¯−i))]
As we have seen in the proof of Proposition 2, for any deposit profile d there
is a unique equilibrium cˆ∗(d) at stage 2 of P̂G. This is not true for stage 1 since
d¯i is only weakly dominant for player i. Any tuple (d, cˆ
∗), with di = 0 for at least
two i, also constitutes a Nash equilibrium of P̂G. In such an equilibrium, there is
no contribution to the public good at stage 2. However, di = 0 is not a dominant
strategy for player i, given that play continues with cˆ∗. In fact, (d¯, cˆ∗) is the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in stage-wise dominant strategies.
As a last step, we show that the above result remains to hold if the institution
collecting and administering the deposits is assumed to be costly, and if players,
when paying their deposits, have to bear a small share of this cost. To see
this, consider following modification of P̂G, denoted by P˜G. Different from the
previous case, assume now that a fraction ε > 0 of any deposit made is kept for
the maintenance of the respective institution. Thus, if at the end of stage 1 we
have di = 0 for some i, then in stage 2 the game PG is played except that now
player i’s payoff function is given by:
p˜ii(c1, . . . , cn) =

Ui
(
ei − εd¯i − ci, F
(∑
j fj(cj)
))
, if di = d¯i
Ui
(
ei − ci, F
(∑
j fj(cj)
))
, if di = 0
If at the end of stage 1 we have di = d¯i for all i, then again PG
∗ is played with
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the following modification of the players’ payoff functions:
p˜i∗i (c1, . . . , cn) =

Ui
(
ei − d¯i − ci, F
(∑
j fj(cj)
))
, if ci < c¯i
Ui
(
ei − εd¯i − ci, F
(∑
j fj(cj)
))
, if ci = c¯i
Hence, player i’s payoff in P˜G is
Π˜i[(d1, c1), . . . , (dn, cn)] =
 p˜i
∗
i (c1, . . . , cn) , if dj = d¯j for all j
p˜ii(c1, . . . , cn) , else.
Proposition 3 below states that also under these modifications everyone paying
the deposit in stage 1 and full contributions to the public good in stage 2 still
can be implemented as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of P˜G.
Proposition 3 Assume that d¯i satisfies (2) for all i. Then, there exists ε¯ > 0
such that for 0 < ε < ε¯, P˜G has exactly two subgame perfect Nash equilibria
(d∗, cˆ∗). In one equilibrium, d∗i = d¯i for all i in stage 1; in the other equilibrium
d∗i = 0 for all i in stage 1. In both equilibria cˆ
∗ is as given in Proposition 2. Both
equilibria are strict.
The proof immediately follows from the fact that by continuity inequality (1)
implies that
Ui
(
ei − εd¯i − c¯i, F
(∑
j
fj(c¯j)
))
> Ui(ei, 0)
and that inequality (2) implies that
Ui
(
ei − εd¯i − c¯i, F
(∑
j 6=i
fj(cj) + fi(c¯i)
))
> Ui
(
ei − d¯i, F
(∑
j 6=i
fj(cj)
))
for all i if ε is sufficiently small.
3 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a simple two-stage mechanism which implements
full contributions to the public good in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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Similar to a smoker who publicly announces to refrain from smoking in order to
make failure prohibitively costly (or a co-author who freely promises to deliver a
revised version of the paper by the end of the week),2 players in our mechanism
can pay an ex ante deposit which, if paid by all, renders contributing to the public
good a dominant strategy.
The proposed mechanism, in our view, has at least two favourable properties.
First, it implements the provision of public goods in a strict subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. If the cost for running the institution that administers deposits is
negligible, the implementation can even be achieved in a stage-wise dominant
strategy equilibrium. Hence, even though there exist zero-contribution equilibria
as well, the coordination problem is less severe than in case of equilibria that
are non-strict or not in dominant strategies. Second, and most importantly, our
mechanism does not require the presence or establishment of powerful institutions
to implement full contributions to the public good (cf. Falkinger et al., 2000;
Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Gu¨rek et al., 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2006). The reason
is that no ex post punishment of free-riders is required. All that is needed is
an independent institution (e.g. the world bank) that collects deposits, monitors
the players’ contributions and refunds deposits to those who have contributed
to the public good. Hence, our mechanism is particularly suited to implement
international agreements like the Kyoto Protocol, where there is no common
authority that can enforce the punishment of free-riders.
In many situations, like in the case of global warming, there is a general
consensus among the affected parties that the provision of a particular public
good is desirable. Yet, at the same time everyone knows that ex post there is a
strong incentive to free ride on the contributions of others. Hence, societies who
in principle are willing to provide a particular public good (e.g. clean air) can be
expected to agree to the implementation of a self-sanctioning scheme (the deposit)
which helps them to adhere to their intended contribution ex post. In fact, the
mechanism proposed here is indeed quite similar to a self-sanctioning mechanism.
Players themselves submit the deposit and, hence, can also easily be assigned
the burden of proof that they contributed to the public good. Consequently,
2Whether announcements are strong enough to later enforce the desired action may be
questionable. Their frequent use, however, indicates that the targeted commitment effect indeed
is very similar to the one used in our mechanism.
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the institution in our case essentially has to administer the deposits, while its
monitoring role is rather weak. This is different for a punishing institution,
which — in line with conventional legal systems — has to prove that a free-rider
did not contribute to the public good.
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